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High performance incentive grants were incorporated into a num-
ber of domestic federal programs in the 1990s. Section 503 of WIA 
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to award incentive grants to states 
that exceed performance levels for programs authorized by Title I of 
WIA, the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA), and the 
Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act (Perkins). The 
WIA incentive process was designed with the intent to reward “good” 
performance by state government programs implementing workforce 
investment, adult literacy, and vocational education programs.
Financial incentives based on program performance also appeared 
in a number of other federal government programs around the same 
time. Domestic social programs such as Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) and the Food Stamp Program (FSP, since the 
beginning of the 2009 fi scal year called Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program, or SNAP) have also used fi nancial incentives to attempt 
to improve program performance. However, there is growing evidence 
that incentives may in some instances actually harm performance by 
rewarding behaviors that result from programs being more focused on 
receiving the reward than improving program design, delivery, and out-
comes. Incentive programs raise many issues, including choice of how 
large funding should be and possible confl ict between the use of bo-
nuses and the ethos of public service.
This chapter examines high performance bonuses (HPBs) in WIA, 
TANF, and FSP/SNAP. It examines the design of the HPB programs, 
the issues that they raise, and lessons that have been learned from the 
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experience of implementing and operating them. The chapter concludes 
that the HPBs have not worked as intended and that a different ap-
proach improving program performance should be used in the future for 
both the WIA program and TANF. On balance, the FSP/SNAP program 
looks better, but the objectives of the program make it easier to conduct.
WIA HPBs
WIA is a federal–state program.1 The federal government provides 
grants to states to operate the programs, and the states pass most of 
these funds to local workforce investment boards. Workforce services 
are provided by about 3,000 One-Stop Career Centers that are located 
throughout the country. WIA programs provide core, intensive, and 
training services. Services may include job matching, labor market in-
formation, assessment and counseling, and other job search services, as 
well as training services. While all workers can receive core services, 
state workforce agencies determine which workers to serve beyond the 
core services and the mix of services target groups are to receive.
The WIA program was enacted for fi ve years and expired in 2003. 
Since that time the program has been continued by Congress through 
the appropriation process. Unsuccessful proposals to reauthorize the 
program were introduced in 2003, 2005, and 2007. The program seems 
unlikely to be reauthorized before 2011 or 2012.
The Program
HPBs have been offered since the inception of the WIA system. 
States can receive bonuses for amounts between $750,000 and $3 mil-
lion per year if they meet the WIA HPB criteria, depending on fund 
availability. The potential bonuses are of the same amount, regardless 
of the size of the state. To receive an HPB, a state must achieve at least 
80 percent of the annual negotiated target for each of the 17 WIA per-
formance measures that are specifi ed by statute. They must also achieve 
an average of at least 100 percent of the negotiated performance targets 
for the major performance measures groupings for adult, dislocated 
worker, youth, and customer satisfaction measures.
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The WIA program makes fi nancial incentives available as a way 
to reward performance that exceeds the expected level of negotiated 
performance for participants in Title 1B of the WIA Adult, Dislocated 
Worker, and Youth programs. WIA law authorizes the states to use their 
incentive bonuses to carry out an innovative program consistent with 
the requirements of any one or more of the programs within Title I of 
WIA, the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act, or the Perkins Act. 
These provisions allow states great fl exibility in using these funds, and 
the governors and state agencies are not limited to only one type of in-
novative program. States fi nd this money attractive because it not only 
recognizes them for exceeding negotiated performance goals but also 
provides funds for special projects that might not otherwise be imple-
mented due to budget limitations.
WIA fi nancial incentives are complicated because they are a reward 
for meeting conditions for three separate programs. The annual awards 
are determined on the basis of WIA program performance in conjunc-
tion with performance for the Adult Education and Family Literacy 
Act and the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act 
programs. States must meet the criteria established by each individual 
program before they are deemed eligible to apply for a grant. A state 
may demonstrate outstanding performance under WIA requirements 
but be removed from consideration for an award because it falls short 
with respect to program performance for literacy and/or Perkins educa-
tion programs.
WIA HPBs are given for exceeding performance targets, which 
are set by negotiations led by USDOL regional offi ce staff in the six 
USDOL regional offi ces for the USDOL national offi ce. Regional staff 
members negotiate targets with the states based on factors that are con-
sidered to be under their control. If a state has higher unemployment 
levels or serves a more disadvantaged population, however, its perfor-
mance targets should be adjusted downward to accommodate for these 
factors outside of their control. The negotiation process is intended to 
“level the playing fi eld” between states, so that adjustments are made 
for differences between states with respect to anticipated economic and 
demographic characteristics. 
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Issues
Experience with the WIA HPB has drawn attention to a number of 
issues.
Behavioral issues in responding to WIA performance targets. 
Barnow and Smith (2004) review the incentives to state workforce 
agencies and local WIBs to take actions that can improve their WIA 
performance measurement results. Barnow and Smith examine four 
substantive behavioral measures that the WIA system can take:
1) selection of participants who are likely to have good perfor-
mance outcomes (cream skimming),
2) selection of services and service mix provided to improve 
performance,
3) encouragement of workforce agency employees to work harder 
and smarter, and
4) provision of incentives to contractors and subcontractors pro-
viding services.
In addition, state workforce agencies can make strategic decisions 
about how to improve performance by “gaming” the system. In particu-
lar, under both JTPA and WIA, local and state performance outcomes 
could be improved by making determinations about who is formally 
enrolled in the program, and how and when enrollees are exited out 
of the program. For example, formal enrollment can be delayed until 
workers are placed in jobs or become employed. Exiting workers out 
of the program can be accelerated or delayed to maximize performance 
outcomes (Barnow and Smith 2004).
Jacobson (2009) documents the high cost of retaining WIA pro-
gram participants in some localities until a time when their exiting is 
most benefi cial for workforce agency performance measurement pur-
poses. The cost of this extended retention of participants is the time 
it takes program staff to maintain periodic telephone contact with the 
WIA participants rather than providing them with additional employ-
ment services and, secondarily, that this behavior continues solely to 
improve measured program performance outcomes.
Thus, it appears that state workforce agencies have many tools at 
their disposal to improve their measured WIA program performance, if 
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they wish to make use of them. A number of state workforce agencies 
and local WIBs do make use of these techniques.
Incentives for states. While the WIA HPBs are a small proportion 
of total WIA resources available to states, the incentive for states varies 
greatly because each state is eligible for the same bonus amount. Small 
states will fi nd the HPB to be much larger in proportion to their state 
WIA formula grant than is the case for larger states.
Accuracy of the HPB data. Heinrich (2007) assesses whether the 
current HPBs work by looking at two questions. First, she examines the 
accuracy of the data used for the measures. Second, she assesses whether 
the performance award system properly recognizes and rewards high 
performing states. With respect to the fi rst issue, her answer is affi rma-
tive: she fi nds that the data used by the system are reasonably accurate.
Does the HPB properly reward high performing states? With 
respect to the issue of whether the system properly recognizes high per-
formers, Heinrich (2007) provides a negative answer for a number of 
reasons. As we saw above, a core factor in establishing an objective 
WIA performance targeting system is that the targets need to be set to 
establish a level playing fi eld between states. Not surprisingly, she fi nds 
that the negotiation process—determined by USDOL regional staff 
without an objective methodology—does not properly take into con-
sideration economic and demographic characteristics and service mix 
as they differ between states. In particular, she fi nds no adjustment to 
performance targets for differences with respect to education and race. 
Heinrich fi nds that the negotiation process between regional and 
state staff establishes the bonus threshold and therefore plays a key role 
in the outcomes of HPBs. States that negotiate higher performance tar-
gets relative to other states are less likely to receive the bonuses. Thus, 
the negotiation process is crucial to success in obtaining an HPB.
Heinrich also looks at whether there has been a relationship between 
performance and the size of the bonus awarded. She again reaches a 
negative conclusion. She fi nds that some states not receiving a bonus 
appear to have performed better than those that did. States receiving 
higher bonuses did not necessarily perform better than those receiving 
low bonuses.
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Declining Funding of WIA Incentive Grants, 1999–2007
The statutory provisions for the WIA HPB have not changed over 
time, so the HPB program specifi cations have been unchanged for over 
a decade. The only change in the program has been its funding amount. 
Because the USDOL has not sought appropriations for the HPB begin-
ning in federal FY 2004 for federal PY 2003, funding availability has 
declined and has derived only from the Adult Education and Family 
Literacy Act and the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Educa-
tion Act programs.
The USDOL started awarding incentive grants in 1999. The size of 
the grant awards is determined by WIA Section 503(c)(1), which sets 
the range of incentive grant awards from $750,000 to $3 million, de-
pending upon the amount of appropriated funds available. If the amount 
available for grants is insuffi cient to award the minimum grant to each 
eligible state, the minimum and maximum grant amounts are adjusted 
by a uniform percentage as required by WIA Section 503(c)(2). For 
PY 1999 through PY 2002, the Department of Labor requested and re-
ceived funding for the incentive grants, and state workforce agencies 
received funding from the department. 
In its FY 2004 budget request, the USDOL did not request funds 
for WIA incentives. The Bush administration proposed revisions to 
the incentive grant process as part of its unsuccessful WIA reautho-
rization proposal of 2003. Had they been enacted, the new incentive 
grants awarded by the secretary would have been based on performance 
for statewide and local workforce programs authorized by Title I-B of 
WIA. The secretary would base the award on performance of states 
with respect to the performance measures, and/or the performance of 
the state in serving special populations (which could include the level 
of service and the outcomes and other appropriate factors).
In its FY 2005 budget submission, the USDOL requested $12 
million to be awarded to states that successfully addressed barriers to 
employment of special populations (e.g., those with disabilities, individ-
uals with limited English profi ciency, homeless individuals, veterans, 
older Americans, and participants transitioning from welfare to work) 
and placed these individuals into good jobs. The department, however, 
did not propose a quantifi able way to measure delivery of services to 
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these populations. The OMB denied the request for FY 2005 funds, and 
the USDOL has not requested incentive funds since then.
For PY 2006 only the Adult Education program provided funds for 
incentives. However, states were still required to meet the criteria es-
tablished by all three programs in order to qualify. Thus, the amount of 
money available for incentives has been drastically reduced from a high 
of $29.8 million in 2001 to $9.8 million in FY 2007. The amount of the 
incentive grant for the PY 2006 performance awards was based on the 
size of the state’s programs, as measured by the state’s relative share of 
the combined Title I, AEFLA, and Perkins III formula grants awarded 
to that state.
For PY 2007, the Adult Education program was again the sole con-
tributor to state incentive grants amid some changes to performance 
management and at a slightly lower funding level. In 2007, the Labor 
Department revised performance measurement requirements for deter-
mining eligibility of states for receiving incentive grants. In addition to 
changes to WIA performance reporting, the 2007 reauthorization of the 
Perkins Act removed the requirement that funds be reserved for WIA 
performance bonuses. Therefore, the Department of Education no lon-
ger sets aside Perkins Act funds for the purpose of funding incentive 
grants to states. The remaining funding is provided only by the Adult 
Education program, and 11 states were awarded incentive grants for a 
total of $9.76 million in 2007.
For PY 2008, USDOL guidance was issued based on state-
negotiated performance levels that would have had an impact on states’ 
eligibility to qualify for incentive grants. The Labor Department con-
tinued to facilitate the grant review and award process, and the Offi ce 
of Adult Vocational Education within the Department of Education 
continued to fund these grants. In PY 2008, 10 states were awarded 
incentive grants, for a total of $9.76 million.
Variation in State and Regional Receipt of the WIA HPBs
The receipt of WIA fi nancial incentives varies widely by state and 
by region (see Table 10.1). The variation is so great that it points toward 
exogenous infl uences on program performance such as fl uctuations in 
economic conditions or changes in the demographics of state and lo-
cal participants. These wide swings in program performance relative to 
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money available Bonus range Eligible states
1999/6 $10,084,000
$2M from the USDOL
$8.1M from the Dept. of 
Education
$843,351–$2,645,125 Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont
2000/12 $27,580,600
$12M from the USDOL
$15.5 M from the Dept. of 
Education
$750,000–$3,000,000 Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, North Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin
2001/16 $29,760,422
$13.2M from the USDOL
$16.5 M from the Dept. of 
Education
$750,000–$3,000,000 Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Washington, Wyoming
2002/23 $24,422,000
$7.9M from the Dept. of 
Education
$16.9M from the Dept. of 
Education
$750,000–$3,000,000 Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, 
Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas
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Funded by Dept. of 
Education (AEFLA 
& Perkins)
$772,770–$1,076,445 Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, 
Iowa, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina
2004/23 $16,605,048
From the Dept. of Education
(AEFLA & Perkins)
$646,569–$941,250 Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin
2005/10 $16,353,187
From the Dept. of Education
$912,966–$3,000,000 Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington
2006/8 $9,968,489
Funded by AEFLA only
$821,995–$2,148,397 Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Missouri, 
Montana, Ohio, South Carolina, South 
Dakota
2007/11 $9,760,451
Funded by AEFLA only—
no longer funded through the 
Carl D. Perkins Act
$761,088–$1,099,410 Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, South Dakota
2008/10 $9,760,450
Funded by AEFLA only
$784,251–$1,405,909 Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
New York, Tennessee
up11dbw
ia0ch10.indd   285
up11dbw
ia0ch10.indd   285
6/23/2011   11:36:16 A
M
6/23/2011   11:36:16 A
M
286   Wandner and Wiseman
annual targets could be minimized through objective methods of target 
setting accounting for external factors.
There has been a strong concentration in the distribution of incen-
tive grants by state and region during the PY 1999 through PY 2007 
period. During those nine years, states have been eligible for incentive 
awards 125 times. Five states in three regions were eligible for (and 
received) an incentive award fi ve or more times since PY 1999 (see 
Table 10.2). 
Thus, these 5 states have collectively received 31 awards, or nearly 
25 percent of all awards. On the other hand, 9 states received no awards 
(Alaska, Arkansas, California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island), and 12 states 
have received only one award (Idaho, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, 
Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming) through 2007.
There have been large differences among USDOL regions with 
respect to award eligibility. The 9 states in Region 1 (Connecticut, Mas-
sachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Puerto 
Rico, Rhode Island, and Vermont) were eligible to receive 10 awards, 
or about 8 percent of all of the awards. At the other extreme, in Region 
5 (Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ne-
braska, Ohio, and Wisconsin), the 10 states were eligible for 37 awards, 
or about 30 percent of the total awards.
These regional variances, with awards concentrated heavily in some 
regions and not in others, suggest that there might be greater incentives 
or pressure in some regions for states to obtain awards than in others. 
As previously stated, there is no uniform method in place to adjust for 
differences among state economic and labor market environments, so 
when regions of states consistently achieve a signifi cantly higher num-
ber of awards, there is a likelihood of strategic behavior in pursuit of 
these monetary awards.
Consequences
While establishing monetary incentive strategies was popular at the 
outset of the WIA program, this strategy has not proved to be an ef-
fective way to encourage exemplary performance. In fact, it may have 
resulted in reduced services to populations most in need. 
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Since the core performance measures of WIA are based on the ratio 
of the numbers of program participants who exit the program (“ex-
iters”) who obtain and retain employment to those exiters who do not, 
the temptation to reduce the numbers of exiters who do not successfully 
gain employment is high. The risk of using a monetary bonus based on 
performance results is, therefore, that states will engage in manipulative 
reporting, or “gaming,” or even elect to serve those individuals with a 
high likelihood of success (creaming). 
The relationship between WIA monetary incentives and the main-
line WIA programs is weak. State plans providing information on the 
intended use of received bonuses indicate that incentive grant awards 
go toward new programs or increases in services rather than to individ-
uals involved in frontline service. This proposed usage does not provide 
a direct incentive to individual frontline employees for providing exem-
plary or increasingly effective services, since these individuals do not 
receive any monetary return on their investment in improving services.
Thus, it is very possible that individual level service might be 
negatively impacted by offering monetary incentives for achieving per-
formance goals. Providing monetary services without adjusting for the 
characteristics of the population served reduces the incentive to serve 
disadvantaged populations, whether measured by education, disability, 
or race/ethnicity. 
As can be seen in Table 10.1, the annual awards have been declin-
ing over time. The number of states eligible for the awards has declined 
in recent years. The overall annual award amount also has been steadily 
diminishing since the beginning of the WIA program, and funding for 
these incentives has ceased altogether from the USDOL.
Table 10.2  States Receiving the Largest Number of WIA High
Performance Bonuses, 1999–2008





4 North Dakota 5
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The WIA HPB continues despite lack of support from the Labor 
Department because the Adult Education Program continues to provide 
HPB funding. Though there has been no department funding since FY 
2004, the USDOL continued to participate in the HPB process because 
of statutory requirements. 
TANF HPB
The TANF program provides a minimum income for families with 
children. TANF was established in 1996 by the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) as a successor 
to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The 
1996 legislation identifi ed one TANF goal as ending “the dependence 
of needy parents on government benefi ts by promoting job prepara-
tion, work, and marriage.” To promote attainment of this end, the law 
authorized payment of bonuses to “high performing states based on 
a formula to be established by the Department of Health and Human 
Services” (DHHS) in consultation with the National Governors Associ-
ation, the American Public Welfare Association (an organization largely 
representing state social service agency directors that is now called the 
American Public Human Services Association), and other interested 
parties. These HPBs were distributed by the DHHS to states for accom-
plishments from federal fi scal year 1998 through 2004. Funding for the 
program ceased in 2005. 
Experience with the HPB offers a case study of a policy intended 
to provide positive incentives for local program operators to improve 
performance in pursuit of public objectives. The purpose of case studies 
is generally to gain insight into the myriad details that bedevil imple-
mentation of policy and to offer lessons of experience. To this end we 
provide an overview of the program and identify issues and lessons.
Our conclusion is that the indicators upon which the TANF HPB 
was based have numerous shortcomings and, possibly as a result, there 
is no evidence that the TANF HPB affected state policy or program ef-
fectiveness. However, the program leaves an institutional legacy that, 
while diffi cult to replicate elsewhere, may prove valuable as the current 
administration attempts to renew interest in social policy innovation.
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The Program and Its Evolution
To understand the HPB, it is important to understand the federal 
context. TANF is a joint federal–state venture in which states design 
and operate their assistance programs under broad federal guidelines. 
Benefi t levels are determined by states, as are many other eligibility con-
ditions and compliance requirements. Funding is from a combination 
of a state’s own revenues and a fi xed federal contribution determined 
largely by the amount the state received for AFDC during that pro-
gram’s last years. In FY 2004 combined expenditure of federal and state 
funds for TANF amounted to $25.8 billion, of which $14.4 billion came 
from the federal government. Forty-seven percent of the total went for 
income support; the remainder was spent on services, including work 
supports for cash recipients and others meeting TANF-related need 
standards. 
The HPB fi scal stakes were small. The bonuses averaged about 
$200 million per year, less than 1 percent of total outlays. The pro-
gram was voluntary, and no state was allowed to receive in any year an 
amount greater than 5 percent of its TANF block grant. Nevertheless, 
the program was evidently viewed by states as worth the effort required 
to compete. In the fi rst year of competition, 46 states competed; 49 and 
50 participated for FY 1999 and FY 2000, respectively, and thereafter 
generally 50 of the 51 states engaged. 
As required by PRWORA, the HPB criteria were developed in con-
sultation with the National Governors Association, the American Public 
Human Services Association, and a variety of other interested parties 
(DHHS 1999). The bonus awards for FYs 1998, 1999, and 2000 were 
based on four work measures: Job Entry, Success in the Labor Force 
(a measure based on employment retention and earnings gains), and 
improvement from the prior fi scal year in each of these measures. For 
each, the 10 states with the highest performance received awards. It was 
unusual for states to gain awards in all four categories, and therefore it 
was possible for more than 10 states to receive recognition on at least 
one dimension. The awards for FY 1998 went to 27 states (more than 
half of states entering the competition). Twenty-eight states won bo-
nuses for performance in FY 1999, and 27 states did so in for FY 2000. 
States were not obligated to compete on all performance measures, but 
eventually most states chose to do so.
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Over time, the program evolved. In 1999, the DHHS began efforts 
to expand the criteria used for awarding the HPB to include measures 
of state success in raising participation in support programs for work-
ing families and in promoting family formation and stability (DHHS 
1999, p. 68202), which caused an increase in the numbers of indicators 
used. Beginning with the awards made for performance in FY 2001 and 
continuing through FY 2004, the bonus criteria included, in addition to 
the four employment-related measures, indicators for 1) participation 
of low-income working families in the FSP, 2) participation of former 
TANF recipients in the Medicaid program or in the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 3) a child care subsidy measure, 
and 4) a family formation and stability measure. Additionally, a quality 
component was added to the child care subsidy measure beginning in 
FY 2003.
Initially, states competing on work measures were required to 
collect, compile, and submit quarterly performance reports derived 
from earnings data reported by employers to state workforce agencies 
(SWAs) as part of the Unemployment Insurance system. SWA data 
cover only quarterly earnings and do not include hours of work, wage 
rates, or information on the monthly pattern of work within a quarter. 
Measures of Job Entry and the two components of Success in the Labor 
Force (job retention and earnings gain) were constructed from these 
data. Methods clearly varied, and the performance results submitted by 
states to the DHHS were not audited. The consequence was uncertainty 
about the reliability of state-reported achievements, which was further 
undermined by some exceptional accomplishments. One state won $6 
million in the initial round for achieving a job entry rate in FY 1998 of 
88.4 percent, 3.4 standard deviations above the participating state mean 
of 42.6 percent. Signifi cantly, the greatest variance in state performance 
was associated with the Job Entry rate, the measure that offered under 
DHHS instructions the greatest opportunity for variation in state inter-
pretation, data sources, and computation procedures.
Beginning with FY 2001, federal policy changed. Instead of car-
rying out computations themselves, competing states were required 
to submit monthly lists of adult TANF recipients, identifi ed only by 
their Social Security number. These data were then matched against the 
National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) maintained by the DHHS. 
The NDNH is also based on employer wage reports. NDNH data is 
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broader than what is available from state systems in that it includes 
federal employment and provides information on jobs held in one state 
by residents of another (in general state SWA data do not). Use of the 
NDNH leveled the information and computational playing fi eld for the 
HPB employment measures.
Addition of the new performance categories required changes in the 
allocation of the $200 million annual bonus among measures. However, 
the employment measures continued to account for about 70 percent 
of all bonus funds distributed. The additional categories increased 
the number of opportunities for winning a bonus from 4 to 10. When 
awards for FY 2001 and FY 2002 were announced in late September 
2003, 46 states won some amount of bonus money. In the last report 
(for FY 2004), 42 states gained recognition in some category; 24 were 
recognized in 2 or more. The awards for FY 2004, the last performance 
year for awards, are summarized in Table 10.3.
The TANF program itself was reauthorized by the Defi cit Reduc-
tion Act of 2005, but this legislation eliminated funding for the TANF 
HPB program. During the reauthorization debate, virtually no effort 
was made by either the states or the Bush administration to see the 
HPB program extended. Somewhat oddly, the DHHS is still required 
to calculate the basic HPB employment, Food Stamp, and employment 
measures for states that submit the necessary data. The child care and 
Medicaid measures have been dropped (although indicators for these 
programs have been developed in other contexts).
Issues
Implementation and operation of the HPB raised a number of issues 
common to all performance measure programs, including those coupled 
with fi scal incentives.
What to measure. At least at fi rst blush, the HPB performance 
measures sound appropriate—surely job entry, success in the labor 
force, and family formation and stability sound like good things. How-
ever, as often happens, the details pose problems. Consider the Job 
Entry rate. Nominally this would seem to refer to the rate at which 
adults receiving TANF moved in some time period from unemployment 
to some standard of employment. Since the NDNH data record only 
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Job entry Ratio of measure of recipients 
entering employment to total 
unemployed recipients (%)
NDNHa 34.9 Virginia 46.7% 7.3 48.1
Job retention Proportion of currently 
employed recipients with 
earnings in fi rst and second 
subsequent quarters (%)
NDNH 59.0 Hawaii 72.2% n/ab n/a
Earnings gain Increase in aggregate earnings 
between current, second 
following quarter, currently 
employed recipients (%)
NDNH 36.9 South Dakota 81.4% n/a n/a
Success in
labor force
Average rank on job retention 
and earnings gain measures
Calculated n/a Wyoming  1(rank) 0.4 36.9
2003–2004 change
Job entry Change in Job entry rate (Δ%) Calculated 1.2 Virginia 8.2% 0.7 29.5
Job retention Change in Job Retention Rate 
(Δ%)
Calculated −0.5 Louisiana 12.4% n/a n/a
Earnings gain Change in Earnings Gain Rate 
(Δ%)
Calculated 4.3 Georgia 31.4% n/a n/a
Success in labor 
force
Change in average rank on Job 
Retention and Earnings Gain 
measures
n/a Georgia  1(rank) 4.0 22.2
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Proportion of TANF leavers 
who retain enrollment in 




77.5 Pennsylvania 96.0% 4.7 6.3
Food Stamps Proportion of low-income 
working households with 
children under 18 participating 
in Food Stamp Program (%)
Census 
Bureau
37.4 Maine 61.7% 3.0 6.3
Child care 
subsidies
Measure (with quality 
adjustment) of proportion of 
eligible children served under 








Change in Medicaid/SCHIP 
Enrollment Rate (Δ%)
Calculated n/a New Hampshire 7.3% 1.1 14.8











Change in proportion of 
children under 18 residing in 




−0.1 Arizona 5.1% 0.3 10.6
(continued)
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NOTES: aNational Directory of New Hires. bn/a = Measure not applicable.
SOURCE: Administration for Children and Families (2009), Appendix 5. Indicator descriptions are paraphrased and corrected for errors 
in the source.        
         
Table 10.3  (continued)
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quarterly earnings, identifi cation of a job entry using the NDNH must 
be completed on the basis of variation in quarterly earnings. The Job 
Entry rate is a measure of the percentage of the number of unduplicated 
unemployed adult recipients who entered employment for the fi rst time 
during the performance year (i.e., job entries). An adult is considered 
to have entered employment for the fi rst time in a calendar quarter if 
he/she had no earnings in any of the prior quarters of the performance 
year (Administration for Children and Families 2009, Table 5.1). The 
formula is 2
                                Sum of job entries in quarters 1–4     × 100.
Unduplicated number of unemployed 
adult recipients in performance year
It is easy to come up with scenarios in which people lose jobs, take 
up TANF, and are helped to fi nd new employment, but never count in 
the data as a job entry using this formula. On the other end of the list 
of awarded outcomes (see Table 10.3), the measure actually used for 
“family formation and stability” was simply an estimate of the number 
of children under 18 residing in “married family couple groups” as a 
percentage of all children resident in a state. It is unclear why states 
should receive a TANF “high performance” bonus on this measure 
when TANF typically involves less than 5 percent of children at any 
point during the year.3 
Control for context. No adjustment is made in any of the perfor-
mance measures for variation in state economic and social environment. 
In particular, it seems likely that the ability of states to move unem-
ployed recipients into jobs will be affected by local unemployment 
rates as well as the skills, education, and experience of the caseload. 
The DHHS initially argued that its own analysis suggested that “these 
specifi c factors do not determine entry rate to any signifi cant degree” 
(DHHS 2000, p. 52843). Subsequent analysis, using NDNH data, sug-
gests otherwise (Wiseman 2006).
At times, the DHHS argued that inclusion of measures of change 
compensated states in part that were disadvantaged by economic or so-
cial factors. Even when states could not outcompete others on levels of 
achievement, they presumably had a better chance in accomplishing 
improvement. The problem with change measures is that any year’s set 
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of changes is likely in part the consequence of random factors and, over 
time, some regression to the mean can be expected. The larger the state, 
the more likely it is that such factors cancel out and that year-over-year 
change includes less “noise.” Something of this phenomenon may be 
observed in the data: Winning states in the change-in-job-entry category 
tend to be smaller than those winning on the basis of current rates. 
What is welfare about? Historically, social assistance systems 
have generally been intended fi rst and foremost to alleviate need. Fed-
eral law does not set benefi t levels, and as a result, there is exceptional 
interstate variation in the amount of TANF benefi ts. In 2004, a TANF 
recipient family of three received a monthly grant of $786 in California 
and $288 in Indiana. (About 30 percent of this disparity was offset by 
variation in Food Stamp benefi ts.) Yet both states received roughly the 
same HPB amount, and California received no credit for lifting depen-
dent recipients much closer to the national poverty standard. Over the 
life of the HPB, the median state TANF benefi t declined by 10 percent 
in real terms. It seems reasonable to argue that performance in employ-
ment promotion and across other dimensions should be evaluated in 
light of income support accomplishments.
Source of data. A virtue of the NDNH data is that they cover all 
adults and the universe of jobs outside of the shadow economy. There 
are no problems of statistical inference. The data for Medicaid/SCHIP 
come from the states’ own management information systems and also 
present no problems of statistical inference. However, the data on FSP 
participation, participation in subsidized child care, and children’s fam-
ily environment are derived from sample surveys, notably the Current 
Population Survey (CPS). For all but the largest states the CPS sample 
is too small for reliable estimates of these measures, and the problems 
were compounded in estimation of year-to-year changes. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the DHHS summary tables for measure achievement by 
state on these dimensions never include estimated standard errors or 
cautionary notation. 
Both the NDNH and census-based data take a long time to accu-
mulate. Typically, awards were announced almost a year after the last 
quarter included in the performance data. (The awards for FY 2004 
were announced in October 2005.) The result is a substantial temporal 
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disconnect between the performance that was being rewarded and its 
actual identifi cation. 
How to respond. The nature of the TANF HPB indicators made it 
diffi cult for states to deliberately target the outcomes measured. How-
ever, some policies taken for other purposes appear to have infl uenced 
the HPB outcomes. The original TANF legislation included a federal 
requirement that states achieve certain target rates of participation of re-
cipient adults in work-related activities. The impact of these targets was 
diminished because they were reduced in response to caseload decline 
and, for a variety of reasons, the total number of TANF cases fell by 
over 50 percent between FY 1996 and 2004. Nevertheless, some states 
took precautionary steps to reduce the challenge posed by the participa-
tion requirement. One strategy, sanctioned by regulations, was to create 
a Separate State Program (SSP) outside of TANF and wholly funded 
from state revenues. Persons diffi cult to engage in work because of dis-
ability or other problems were then served through these programs, and 
such expenditures were included in assessing state compliance with 
federal “maintenance of effort” regulations intended to sustain state 
contributions to the public assistance effort. Despite this selection, the 
TANF participation rate was calculated only for participants in feder-
ally subsidized TANF. Given that employability was generally a cri-
terion for moving people to SSPs, introduction of such programs 
probably raised performance as measured by the employment-related 
indicators. In 2004, 32 states had SSPs, accounting for about 12.6 per-
cent of all adult recipients. Wiseman (2006) presents evidence that, other 
things equal, states with SSPs had higher rates of job entry, suggesting 
some prizes were won by artful selection. However, the selection ap-
pears to have been motivated by the participation requirement, not the 
HPB competition.
Missing feedback. Performance assessment programs are gen-
erally intended not only to identify exceptional achievement but to 
provide feedback from assessment to improvement. The feedback oc-
curs in at least three ways. The fi rst is that the systems are generally 
intended to enhance the information available to operators. The TANF 
HPB program, based as it was on information not available to state and 
local-level program managers, did not do this for the key employment 
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indicators. The second is that such systems provide points of reference 
for judging accomplishment by comparison to peers. Given lack of ad-
justment in the HPB measures for factors likely to infl uence outcomes 
regardless of management strategy, caution would be essential in mak-
ing cross-state comparisons using HPB data. 
A third feedback dimension occurs at the national management 
level and is notably absent from later years of HPB operation. This is 
use of the data and experience to make improvements in the indica-
tors and to seek better practice in TANF employment policy. After the 
shift to use of the NDNH and census data for performance assessment 
after 2000, no signifi cant changes occurred in the choice of indicators 
or methods of measurement. Moreover, no systematic attempt was 
launched to determine the basis for success as fl agged by the bonuses 
awarded. If policymakers believed that the HPB bonus system uncov-
ered genuine managerial accomplishment, then it would have been 
reasonable to investigate what it was that the states fl agged as “top 10” 
were doing that led to this accomplishment and whether and how the 
technique(s) might be transferred. No such efforts were mounted.
Consequences 
Analysts have made no attempt to assess the effect of the pres-
ence of the HPB on the trajectory of TANF policy at the state level. 
There simply is no reasonable control against which performance and 
response to the HPB stimulus might be assessed. Managers appreciated 
the public acknowledgment that award announcement occasioned, and 
coming outside of state budget cycles, the prizes themselves in many 
cases provided fl exible resources for special projects. But the reality 
was that bonuses were spread across 10 indicators, even the DHHS 
seemed confused about how they were defi ned (see Note 2), and pay-
ments turned not only on what any state accomplished, but also on 
unknown developments elsewhere. Under these circumstances, altering 
policy for the coming year in pursuit of a small award to be obtained 
more than two years in the future made little sense. The absence of 
evidence of effectiveness contributed to lack of enthusiasm for continu-
ation beyond FY 2004. 
What seems clear in both the case of the WIA and TANF perfor-
mance incentive bonus is that they are sought after, and in some cases 
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they appear to be the cause of selective behavior either by states (in the 
case of TANF SSPs) or the programs within a state (creaming and gam-
ing in the case of WIA). For both WIA and TANF, employing a method 
of setting performance targets that could essentially level the playing 
fi eld with respect to economic conditions and program participant char-
acteristics would go a long way in making the HPB a more successful 
incentive to improve instead of alter program performance.4
Additionally, the effectiveness of both the TANF and WIA HPB 
programs has suffered due to a weak causal relationship; the perfor-
mance indicator used to measure TANF program success has been a 
moving target, and there is no correlation between statewide program 
performance and the size of the HPB in WIA. Lacking a distinctive 
connection between cause (high program performance) and effect 
(bonus award), the HPB tactic, while it in many cases does reward well-
functioning programs, does not appear for either TANF or WIA to be 
eliciting the purely motivated and zealous program behavior it was de-
signed to. On a positive note, these are not insurmountable problems to 
fi x. Clearing up the muddiness of TANF performance metrics and the 
arbitrariness of WIA HPB award amounts could increase the effective-
ness of the HPB approach.
FOOD STAMP/SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM HPB
SNAP is the most important means-tested income support pro-
gram in the United States. It is administered nationally by the Food and 
Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
operated locally by state governments or by county governments with 
state supervision. Before October 2008, SNAP was called the Food 
Stamp Program (FSP). The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 
2002 (“The Farm Bill”) included provision for an HPB for states exhib-
iting exemplary administrative performance. This section summarizes 
the architecture and operation of the FSP/SNAP HPB and compares it 
to its inspiration, the HPB introduced for the TANF program in 1996. 
The conclusion is that, in part because of certain programmatic advan-
tages, the FSP/SNAP HPB is the better designed and operated, but the 
up11dbwia0ch10.indd   299 6/23/2011   11:36:17 AM
300   Wandner and Wiseman
program’s small size and universal availability make its impact diffi cult 
to assess.
Background
The SNAP benefi t is delivered by electronic benefi ts transfer and 
collected when recipients use a special debit card to purchase food. In 
FY 2008, state and federal outlays on (then) FSP benefi ts and adminis-
tration totaled $37.7 billion; in contrast state and federal expenditures 
on TANF benefi ts amounted to just $25 billion, and only about half of 
this was for income support. At any time, slightly less than 10 percent 
of the U.S. population resides in a SNAP-recipient household; because 
of turnover (eligibility is determined on a monthly basis), a larger pro-
portion of the population receives benefi ts at some time during the year. 
SNAP’s importance lies in its universality: The program lacks most of 
the categorical restrictions imposed for eligibility on other forms of in-
come support.
SNAP is an entitlement, meaning that all persons who meet federal 
eligibility standards have a legal right to benefi ts. Accordingly, fund-
ing responds to meet demand. The federal government pays all benefi t 
costs, but the costs of administration are shared roughly equally be-
tween the federal and state governments. This arrangement invites lax 
administration. Since state governments pay a substantial fraction of 
administrative costs but no share of benefi ts costs, without other incen-
tives they have little motivation for excellence, save an institutional 
adherence to eligibility rules. This incentive problem is addressed by a 
well-developed, sample-based quality control system that provides both 
data on characteristics of SNAP recipients and information on accuracy 
of eligibility and payments determination. States are liable for the costs 
of errors made, including both costs that accrue to the federal govern-
ment and the cost to participants of being paid less than the benefi ts to 
which they are entitled. Sanctions are assessed against states with error 
rates that are persistently high relative to the national average.
States and advocates have long argued that the Food Stamp quality 
control system reduced the incentive for states to promote access to food 
stamps by households whose circumstances raised the likelihood of eli-
gibility and computation errors. In particular, households with earnings 
are more likely to experience income fl uctuation and to create diffi cul-
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ties for benefi t calculation. While households with earnings might be 
administratively problematic, the “working poor” were considered an 
important target for FSP (and, more recently, SNAP) outreach, since 
USDA take-up estimates suggested that the rate of program participa-
tion was particularly low among eligible working households (Leftin 
and Wolkwitz 2009). In 2002 Congress attempted to address some of 
these issues, both by modifying benefi t computational requirements to 
reduce the likelihood of error and by shifting the focus of administrative 
assessment from errors to outreach and achievement. The FSP/SNAP 
HPB is part of that effort.
THE HPBs
The 2002 Farm Bill authorized the Food and Nutrition Service 
(FNS) to “establish performance measures relating to actions taken 
to correct errors, reduce rates of error, improve eligibility determina-
tions, and other indicators of effective administration; measure states’ 
performance against these performance measures; and award perfor-
mance bonus payments totaling $48 million for each fi scal year to state 
agencies that show high or most improved performance relating to the 
performance measures” (FNS 2005, p. 6314).
The FNS responded with four bonus categories. Three catego-
ries—best payment accuracy, best negative error rate, and application 
processing timeliness—cover administrative matters. The fourth, pro-
gram access, involves outreach. Levels and changes are both measured 
for everything but processing timeliness. Features of the awards for FY 
2008 are summarized in Table 10.4 below. Total state FSP administra-
tive expenses for FY 2008 were about $3 billion, so, at $48 million, the 
bonuses amount to less than a 2 percent increment in aggregate. For 
the individual state winners, however, the gain can be quite signifi cant.
The payment accuracy indices are simply the sum of sample-based 
estimates of the dollar value of overpayments and underpayments dur-
ing the year. The FNS Web site reports the components of this measure 
for each state. On average, the overpayments component is four times 
the size of the underpayments amount. The offi cial reports give no in-
formation on precision of estimates, but the sampling strategy is simple 
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Payment accuracy Sum of erroneous under- and 
overpayments as proportion of 
total benefi ts (%)
5.0 8 Florida 0.8 7.2 24.0
Payment accuracy 
improvement
Change in payment accuracy 
measure, FY 2007–FY 2008 (Δ %)
3 Georgia −5.6 4.1a
Negative error rate Proportion of applications or cases 
denied, suspended, or terminated 
in error 
11.0 4 Nebraska 0.0 0.7 6.0
Negative error rate 
improvement
Change in negative error measure, 
FY 2007–FY 2008 (Δ %; negative 
identifi es error decline)




Proportion of approved applicants 
given benefi t access within target 
time (30 days for normal cases, 
7 days for cases qualifi ed for 
expedited processing)
87.8 6 Montana 98.0 0.3 6.0
Program access Ratio of average monthly number 
of SNAP participants over calendar 
year to number of persons in 
families with incomes less than 
125 percent of the federal poverty 
standard (%)
58.6 4 Missouri 90.0 2.6 12.0
Program access 
improvement
Change in program access 
measure, 2007–2008 (Δ %)
3.8 4 Maryland 10.0 1.4
Total 48.0
aGeorgia won awards in both level and improvement categories.
SOURCE: FNS; defi nitions paraphrased.         
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and samples for all states are large enough to produce equivalent preci-
sion.5 No agency can win money for both “best” and “most improved,” 
so Georgia, which scored in both categories, got only one award. The 
FNS gives each winning state agency a base award of $100,000, and the 
remainder is distributed in proportion to average monthly caseload. The 
result is that Florida ended up receiving $7.2 billion and the Virgin Is-
lands got $148,000. The “federalist” character of this exercise is evident 
in the “national average.” This is not, as might be presumed, an estimate 
of the accuracy of all payments in aggregate. It is the arithmetic aver-
age of state estimates, so the Virgin Islands receive the same weight as 
California. The national payment accuracy rate would be a measure of 
FNS performance, and that’s not in accord with the HPB concept.
The “negative error rate” calculations refer not to costs but preva-
lence of mistakes in actions involving denial, suspension, or termination 
of benefi ts. This, too, is sample based. Perhaps the most striking thing 
in Table 10.4 is the “national average.” Again, this is not the national 
average for transactions of this sort, but rather the average achievement 
across states. These data pose political problems, since each negative 
error involves denial of benefi t to a family in need, and some states 
have rates that are very high—in one case 17 percent. The negative er-
ror rates are the only components of the bonus system for which the full 
“league table” of outcomes for all states is not published on the Web.
Application timeliness is relatively straightforward. One issue con-
cerns defi nition of when the benefi t is received. FSP/SNAP participants 
may not use their benefi t immediately, just as cash recipients may not 
begin spending immediately. The timeliness defi nition works with the 
point at which the new recipient’s electronic benefi ts transfer card can 
be used.
It is common to claim that take-up rates for the FSP/SNAP are low, 
and the FNS has long been criticized for not effectively promoting out-
reach. The program access index is part of the agency’s response. The 
index is the ratio of persons living in households receiving FSP/SNAP 
benefi ts to an estimate of persons living in families with incomes less 
than 125 percent of the national poverty standard (FNS 2009). This 
denominator is intended to approximate roughly the number of persons 
actually eligible for benefi ts; various adjustments are made to both the 
numerator and the denominator to refl ect special state circumstances 
(for example, distribution of food assistance by means other than SNAP 
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in Native American reservations). Calling this measure the program 
access index rather than program access rate refl ects the agency’s con-
cern that it not be misinterpreted. Over time the program access index 
has been improved, most notably by shifting the base of state poverty 
estimates from the CPS to the much larger American Community Sur-
vey. The American Community Survey sample size is about 3 million 
households per year, compared to roughly 100,000 in the CPS Annual 
Social and Economic Supplement.
While the American Community Survey may be much larger than 
the CPS, it contains much less data on household characteristics and 
sources of income—factors important in determining FSP/SNAP eli-
gibility. The FNS contracts with a consulting fi rm, Mathematica Policy 
Research, to develop more sophisticated estimates of state FSP/SNAP 
participation rates using the CPS. In one of the few applications of 
Bayesian techniques to empirical study of U.S. welfare policies, the 
Mathematica Policy Research team uses shrinkage estimators to com-
bine observations from state CPS subsamples with regression-based 
predictions of participation based on other states’ experience (Cunning-
ham, Castner, and Schirm 2009). The results are mixed. In FY 2006 
(the latest year for which the CPS-based participation estimates are 
available), the correlation between state ranking on the program access 
index and ranking on estimated participation rates was 0.86; three of the 
top four prizewinners would have still won had the (presumably) supe-
rior participation rate measure of access been employed. For change, 
the results are much different: The correlation is ~0.4 and only one state 
appears in both the top four “most improved” lists. What appears to 
be happening is that the Bayesian shrinkage estimator for state par-
ticipation rates takes out a lot of “noise” in the data, noise that without 
adjustment may be interpreted as change.
To the agency’s credit, the FNS is aware of these problems and 
has published analyses of them (cf. FNS 2006). The argument for the 
program access index as currently calculated is that the number is avail-
able by the statutory deadline of September of the year following the 
performance year. This is a work in progress; the challenge is to fi nd an 
indicator with a more credible connection to genuine improvement in 
achieved participation rates.
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Net Effects
Has the bonus system actually improved performance? It is diffi cult 
to judge, both because of the absence of a counterfactual and because 
changes over time in eligibility standards have reduced the rigor of 
eligibility defi nition. Nevertheless, the story is mixed. Average state 
achievement on the Payment Error Rate has fallen from 6.63 in FY 
2003 to the 5.01 recorded for FY 2008 in Table 10.4. On the other hand, 
the average negative error rate has increased from 7.6 to 11.0. Access, 
as measured both by the program access index and estimated participa-
tion rates (through 2006), is also up, both for all families and the subset 
with earnings. This of course could simply be the product of publication 
of the “league tables” of state achievement on the various dimensions 
used for HPB assessment. But the bonuses do serve to draw attention 
to data and add to whatever motivation exists for state operators to seek 
improvement opportunities.
The Missing Element
If there is a shortcoming here, it is in the absence of an openly 
debated agenda for evaluation and refi nement. However, the FNS does 
engage in a number of forums in which federal and state offi cials con-
fer—most notably the meetings of what is now called the American 
Association of SNAP Directors. The problems with the program ac-
cess and other measures are openly addressed in its sponsored research. 
Nevertheless, there is little institutional apparatus either for developing 
a vision of where the management system should be headed or refi ne-
ment of the performance indicators for assessing progress toward that 
goal.
SNAP program administration is an interesting contrast to WIA and 
TANF in that there is a tremendous amount of control on the part of the 
program or state administrators to improve performance over the four 
metrics in use. The metrics, however, are designed to have this effect. 
In essence, the proper or improved functioning of SNAP is the goal, 
whereas the expected levels of performance for WIA and TANF apply 
to the participants of the program (e.g., employment, or reemployment 
rates), who are strongly infl uenced by behavioral and economic factors 
and labor market conditions. Awarding a program a monetary bonus for 
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performance metrics specifi c to the functioning of that program (i.e., 
SNAP) may create an environment more conducive to improved pro-
gram performance using HPBs. Regardless, rewarding program rather 
than participant behavior has allowed SNAP to make a much stronger 
connection between the annual performance levels and the amount of 
the incentive award.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM HPB PROGRAMS
While there are similarities and differences between the three HPB 
programs we have examined, there are a number of lessons that can be 
learned from their use.
Inadequate Emphasis on Best Practice 
Arguably the greatest failing of the TANF HPB was that after one 
major round of reform, it went nowhere. An important indicator of the 
quality of management systems is the presence of procedures for feed-
back, assessment, and improvement. It is virtually impossible to predict 
in advance all problems and opportunities that will arise in context of 
development of performance assessment and incentive systems. Any 
plan for implementation of a performance assessment and bonus system 
should include provisions for review and adjustment. 
WIA programs similarly missed an opportunity to exemplify bonus 
award winners as leaders in best practices. As shown in Table 10.1, 
HPBs have been awarded to a narrow set of states from year to year, 
and therefore do not appear to be encouraging the spreading of perfor-
mance-enhancing practices which would lead to a wider set of states 
achieving bonuses.
By contrast, in the SNAP program, the clear connection between 
nationally rewarded outcomes and local management is emphasized by 
the FNS on its Web site, where the data on achievement are followed 
by links to information on “promising practices” for improving access, 
outreach, improving payment accuracy, and managing recent increase 
in demand for SNAP benefi ts.6 Improvement of local management is 
promoted by FNS regional offi ces.
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Insuffi cient Focus on Objectives
The WIA monetary incentives are small and are likely to have weak 
impacts on state workforce agencies serving moderate to large numbers 
of participants. Typically, incentives to improve performance are higher 
with high bonus amounts, but in the case of WIA, even if all states were 
to apply for and receive the maximum incentive grant award, this total 
amount would be a very small percentage of annual WIA funding. With 
a weak link between award amounts and program performance, the ob-
jective of improved program effi cacy is lost, particularly in large states.
The TANF HPB indicators are distinctly ad hoc and seem to miss 
essentials. This creates a sense of arbitrariness in the factors determin-
ing which states receive awards. It also creates an unstable link between 
program performance and HPB achievements. Indicators need to be 
motivated by a philosophy of what the system is attempting to accom-
plish in order to improve program performance.
Only the SNAP program shows promise in connecting the HPB 
with the program objectives. The SNAP bonus program has a direct 
connection with what is done and what should be monitored at the 
“ground level,” i.e., where SNAP eligibility is assessed and benefi ts are 
calculated and delivered.
Negative Impact on Program Operation
WIA differs from previous workforce development programs like 
JTPA in discontinuing use of state or local regression analysis, which 
factored in prevailing regional labor market and economic conditions 
that affect workforce program outcomes in setting targets. Instead, 
states make adjustments for these exogenous factors through a negotia-
tion process in setting performance targets. Offering incentive grants 
may apply pressure at the state level to encourage manipulative behav-
ior to negotiate lower performance targets to increase the likelihood 
of achieving the performance levels required to qualify for incentive 
grants.
What this pressure does at the programmatic level is to discourage 
frontline service to those participants hardest to serve, which are often 
those most in need, in order to secure higher levels of performance. 
This effect of programmatic disinclination to offer services or to pro-
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cess claims for challenging populations occurs in both the WIA and the 
TANF programs.
Greater Care Needed Regarding Data Use and Validity
In the case of TANF, greater caution should be exercised with 
regard to statistical inference. It is doubtful that any honest govern-
mental purpose is served by ignoring the shortcomings of sample-based 
achievement estimators. Where possible, data on the target “universe” 
are better, but such data often come with their own problems. In any 
event, statistical inference based on data to which operators have access 
is better than numbers that cannot be audited.
The FSP/SNAP bonus systems rest on a good deal of statistical 
inference. A substantial effort is made to report precision of estimation 
and to acknowledge the role of random factors in affecting interstate 
comparisons. The data on participation rates, for example, are reported 
in a league chart that includes confi dence intervals around point esti-
mates (see Cunningham, Castner, and Schirm 2009, p. 2).
All of the three SNAP operations-related performance indicators 
used to award HPBs are subject to, and indeed derived from, a uniform, 
sample-based audit. This methodology diminishes the potential for bias 
and for results skewed by exogenous factors, which reduces the risk of 
creating an award program with unreasonable benchmarks. One draw-
back, however, is that HPBs have been awarded to high performing 
states relative to a national average which, given the wide variation in 
state performance levels, decreases the sensitivity of this approach in 
determining HPB awards.
The WIA HPB, by contrast, does not make use of statistical infer-
ence. State submissions of performance data for the HPB program are 
accepted by the USDOL, subject to a data validation process adminis-
tered for each state.
Institutional Development Can Be an Important Product 
The primary original purpose of the NDNH was the creation of a 
database to support pursuit across state borders of noncustodial parents 
obligated to provide child support. Performance assessment for TANF 
is something quite different, and manipulation of NDNH data for this 
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purpose has required substantial administrative investment. Though the 
TANF HPB is not currently in use, the apparatus developed for analysis 
of the NDNH has been used for other DHHS policy research.
In 2008, a new administration was elected with a new social policy 
agenda. Since the January 2009 inauguration, a new leadership team 
was installed at the DHHS. As of the end of 2010, the social policy 
objectives beyond universal health care had yet to be announced in de-
tail, but planning was under way for the next reauthorization of TANF, 
scheduled for 2010 but deferred until 2011. TANF is the responsibil-
ity of the DHHS Administration for Children and Families (ACF). In 
anticipation of reauthorization, ACF working groups were established 
both to review performance measures and to develop a new set of in-
centives for innovation in social policy, in part following the lead of the 
Department of Education’s “Invest in Education” fund. It appears likely 
that data from the NDNH, restructured in light of HPB performance, 
will play a role in these developments.
Similarly, the WIA program will await reauthorization until at least 
2011 or 2012. There has been no indication of whether the HPB is to be 
recommended for continuation in the new legislation or not. 
CONCLUSIONS
Offering monetary bonus awards as an incentive to improve per-
formance—once a favored approach in the business world—has had 
inconclusive impacts on governmental program performance, and 
might actually be encouraging programs to alter their behavior to im-
prove their chances of gaining a bonus at the expense of not serving 
their customers.
Though PYs 2000–2002 were the highest for receipt of WIA HPBs, 
there isn’t a clear legacy of improved program performance resulting 
from use of this incentive system. The states that received WIA bo-
nuses have done so sporadically and have received differing amounts 
from year to year, and state-by-state comparisons of HPBs between 
states within the same year reveal little logic in how the amounts are 
assigned. At best, this type of incentive appears to have minimal impact 
on improving program performance, and at worst, might decrease pro-
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gram effectiveness. When an HPB is offered through the WIA program, 
the temptation intensifi es to either selectively report on only favorable 
performance data or to strategically negotiate performance levels to 
increase the probability of qualifying for a bonus. In addition, the inci-
dences of gaming the system in WIA to obtain monetary performance 
incentives has resulted in reduction of services to diffi cult-to-serve 
populations for which job entry (a primary performance indicator) is 
particularly challenging. 
TANF programs show some reporting patterns that also indicate 
that select reporting has been occurring in order to increase the reported 
performance rates. Since TANF does not offer the same opportunity 
that WIA does to negotiate expected performance levels for each state, 
those states characterized by a depressed economy have been at a dis-
advantage in qualifying for a bonus. States have been further alienated 
from any benefi ts of a monetary bonus because of insuffi cient or invalid 
data, and inconsistent data requirements in TANF have lent an air of 
arbitrariness to the award of these fi nancial incentives. The temporal 
gap between program performance and bonus award is wide due to re-
porting delays and, since no effort has been made to exemplify the top 
performers in encouraging overall performance increases, it isn’t even 
clear from the federal administration of TANF that these bonuses are a 
useful tool for increasing program performance levels.
The SNAP program offers a more promising bonus model and, 
compared to WIA and TANF, it has large strategic advantages. The 
objective of the program is near-immediate: delivering a well-defi ned 
benefi t to a target population each month. This means that outcomes 
can be observed very soon after the management actions that do or 
do not produce them. Moreover, the foundation of assessment is a 
well-designed audit program for procedures that are intended to be 
identical nationwide. That said, the transparency developed for assess-
ment procedures and the ongoing assessment of measure validity seems 
admirable and worthy of study by social assistance agencies in other 
departments and, for that matter, other countries. It is possible that the 
unusual name and character of the SNAP/FSP has caused the program 
to be overlooked by those from abroad looking for promising practice 
in social assistance governance.
Federal funding of HPBs in WIA and TANF has in fact signifi cantly 
diminished or ceased by this point, and funding for the SNAP bonus 
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has never been large. Overall, the challenges in estimating the merit of 
these awards based on inconsistent data sources, the fact that the bo-
nuses do not provide any monetary gain to local service providers, and 
the pressure they place on programs to alter their reporting or service 
behavior in a nonaltruistic direction makes HPBs in government pro-
grams an ineffi cient use of federal resources. 
Notes
1. As used in this chapter, the term state includes the District of Columbia.
2. Actually, this defi nition, taken from the Labor Department’s Annual TANF report, 
is incorrect. The numerator in the actual calculation is the sum across four quarters 
of unduplicated TANF recipient adults with earnings in the current quarter but 
no earnings in the quarter preceding divided by the unduplicated sum across four 
quarters of TANF recipient adults who meet the unemployment criterion, i.e., have 
no reported earnings in the previous quarter (see Wiseman [2006] for more detail). 
3. A higher proportion of children receive TANF assistance at some point during the year. 
4. A pilot program is under way at the USDOL to test the effect of economic and 
demographic characteristics on local and state workforce program performance. It 
is possible this pilot program will affect the WIA HPB should it remain available 
for state employment and training programs.
5. The 1/100th of a percent difference between Mississippi and North Carolina is 
undoubtedly not signifi cant, and the 3.22 percent payment error rate for the mar-
ginal winning “state,” the Virgin Islands, was hardly different from the runner-up, 
Colorado, at 3.32, so chance clearly plays a role. 
6. See http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/government/program-improvement.htm.
References
Administration for Children and Families (ACF). 2009. Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TAN F): Eighth Annual Report to Congress. Washing-
ton, DC: Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services. 
Barnow, Burt S., and Jeffrey A. Smith. 2004. “Performance Management in 
U.S. Job Training Programs.” In Job Training Policy in the United States, 
Christopher J. O’Leary, Robert A. Straits, and Stephen A. Wandner, eds. Ka-
lamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, pp. 21–55.
Cunningham, Karen E., Laura A. Castner, and Allen L. Schirm. 2009. Empiri-
cal Bayes Shrinkage Estimates of State Food Stamp Program Participation 
up11dbwia0ch10.indd   311 6/23/2011   11:36:19 AM
312   Wandner and Wiseman
Rates in 2004–2007 for All Eligible People and the Working Poor. Final 
report to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. 
Alexandria, VA: U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). 1999. “Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, High Perform ance Bonus.” Federal Register 64(233): 
68201–68226.
–———. 2000. “Bon us to Reward State for High Performance under the 
TANF Program: Final Rule.” Federal Register 65(169): 52814–52855.
DiMartini, Traci. 2007. “Workforce Investment Act High Performance Bonuses.” 
Unpublished manuscript.
Food and Nutrition Service (FNS). 2005. “Food St amp Program: High Perfor-
mance Bonuses, Final Rule.” Federal Register 70: 6313–6323. 
———. 2006. “Est imating the Number of People in Poverty for the Program 
Access Index: The American Community Survey vs. the Current Population 
Survey.” Alexandria, VA: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutri-
tion Service. http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/rules/Memo/2006/080206a.pdf 
(accessed October 29, 2010).
———. 2009. “Cal culating the Snap Program Access Index: A Step-by-Step 
Guide.” Alexandria, VA: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nu-
trition Service. http://www.fns.usda.gov/ora/menu/Published/snap/FILES/
Other/pai2008.pdf (accessed January 5, 2010).
Heinrich, Carolyn J. 2007. “False or Fitting Recog nition? The Use of High 
Performance Bonuses in Motivating Organizational Achievements.” Jour-
nal of Policy Analysis and Management 26(2): 281–304.
Jacobson, Louis. 2009. “Strengthening One- Stop Career Centers: Helping 
More Unemployed Workers Find Jobs and Build Skills.” Discussion Paper 
No. 2009-01. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, The Hamilton Project.
Leftin, Joshua, and Kari Wolkwitz. 2009. Trends in Supplemental Nutrition 
Assi stance Program Participation Rates: 2000–2007. Alexandria, VA: U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Offi ce of Research 
and Analysis.
Wiseman, Michael. 2006. “TANF Job Entry: St ate Performance and State Pol-
icy.” Paper presented at the Twenty-Eighth Annual Research Conference, 
Association for Public Policy and Management, held in Madison, Wiscon-
sin, November 2–4. 
up11dbwia0ch10.indd   312 6/23/2011   11:36:19 AM
